Thus, the guiding standard must be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or "improving the quality of the legal service available to the people of the State."
"[T]he objective must be to devise a way of preventing compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by employees who object thereto without restricting the Union's ability to require every employee to contribute to the cost of collective-bargaining activities."
Second, the [bar member] — the individual whose First Amendment rights are being affected — must have a fair opportunity to identify the impact of the [bar’s] action on his interests and to assert a meritorious First Amendment claim.
If any member is interested in a Keller Refund, they should contact me and I’ll address it with them individually, after consulting with my Board.
[A] “pure rebate approach 475 U.S. 292, 304] is inadequate.” We explained that, under such an approach, in which the union refunds to the non-union employee any money to which the union was not entitled, “the union obtains an involuntary loan for purposes to which the employee objects.”
First, as in Ellis, a remedy which merely offers dissenters the possibility of a rebate does not avoid the risk that dissenters’ funds may be used temporarily for an improper purpose. “[T]he Union should not be permitted to exact a service fee from nonmembers without first establishing a procedure which will avoid the risk that their funds will be used, even temporarily, to finance ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining.”... A forced exaction followed by a rebate equal to the amount improperly [475 U.S. 292, 306] expended is thus not a permissible response to the nonunion employees’ objections.
Finally, the original Union procedure was also defective because it did not provide for a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decisionmaker. Although we have not so specified in the past, 19we now conclude that such a requirement is necessary. The nonunion employee, whose First Amendment rights are affected by the agency shop itself and who bears the burden of objecting, is entitled to have his objections addressed in an expeditious, fair, and objective manner.20 [475 U.S. 292, 308]The Union's procedure does not meet this requirement. As the Seventh Circuit observed, the "most conspicuous feature of the procedure is that from start to finish it is entirely controlled by the union, which is an interested party, since it is the recipient of the agency fees paid by the dissenting employees."
“If any member is interested in a Keller Refund, they should contact me and I’ll address it with them individually, after consulting with my Board.”
The North Dakota procedure is deficient in almost every respect. First, it does not provide an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee by categorizing items as chargeable or nonchargeable, and it expressly places an unconstitutional burden on the dissenting member to identify the challenged legislative policy. The procedure does not provide a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the determination of amount of dues devoted to nongermane activities, nor does it provide payment of interest on any amount refunded from the date the dues are paid. Finally, the policy does not provide for a hearing before an impartial decisionmaker, or for an escrow for the amount reasonably in dispute while the challenges are pending.